

ADDRESS OF ALLEN WELSH DULLES
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
TO THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE
AT PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA
3 OCTOBER 1955

It is an honor to appear before this Association which represents so many of those engaged in law enforcement in the free world.

If I were asked to point out the most obvious difference between the free world and the communist dominated areas it would be this. The free world provides for law enforcement that protects the right and liberties of the individual. Here the police authority represents the very essence of democracy in action. Law enforcement in the communist world looks first and foremost to safeguarding the ruling regime without regard for individual rights. Here the police authority becomes the shield of entrenched autocratic authority.

It is fortunate that over the years steady progress has been made in improving our techniques of law enforcement and in building up cooperation between the various jurisdictions of police authorities on both a national and international scale. For since 1917 and increasingly during the past decade the problem of maintaining domestic law and order has had to face a new and unprecedented danger -- world-wide communist activity.

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What we often refer to as organized crime on the domestic front certainly presents you with plenty of problems. But there is a sharp difference between the resources and capabilities of the private criminal, whether acting singly or in organized groups, ~~and the international~~ conspiracy of communism, with its headquarters in Moscow, an affiliated organization in Peiping, and branch offices in Warsaw, Prague and many other centers.

Such a world-wide conspiracy as this fosters no ordinary breed of criminal. It is engaged in no ordinary type of law breaking. Its members are carefully trained, operate with great skill and with the backing of a far flung and efficient organization. Its work is often hard to detect, partly because the motives which influence the ordinary criminal are lacking. Here the real motive is the weakening of the fabric of non-communist states in time of peace in order that it may be vulnerable to the long-range designs of the communist movement. The success so far achieved, here and in many other countries, in controlling this conspiracy is a fine tribute to the efficiency of the police organizations of the free world.

The Soviets keep as a closely guarded secret the number of their own citizens and of foreign indigenous agents who are trained in the USSR, in China, and in the Satellites for subversion and espionage. Certainly there are many tens of thousands. As the students graduate, they flow into the Communist apparatus throughout the world. You have undoubtedly met some of these alumni, and if not, you certainly will.

Some high members of the MVD have revolted against the methods they have been taught to practice, and have come over voluntarily -- "defected" -- to the free world. They have told us much. Some of this has been published to the world. The Petrov case in Australia is a good example of this. In other cases, for security reasons, it has seemed to be wiser to hold back on publicity to help us to delve more deeply into the Communist organization and practices.

We estimate that the Soviet expenditures in training, support and operation of its over-all subversive mechanism may approach 10 percent of its expenditure on its over-all armament program. On a comparable basis, that is, assuming that we spent a comparable percentage of our defense budget for defense against these activities, we would be allocating to this work some three to four billion dollars annually. I need hardly tell you that such is not the case!

The importance of police and other internal security forces in this work has become more and more evident in many parts of the world. Our conventional military forces are normally designed to cope with open, external aggression. Where countries are subject to communist subversive tactics, the internal security forces must generally be the first line of defense. It is up to them to ferret out the agents of subversion, stop the damage before it gets out of hand, and thus maintain internal domestic peace and quiet without the necessity for calling on the military forces to deal with open revolt. In some instances, take Czechoslovakia in 1948, for example, where the police force is infiltrated or comes under ineffective leadership, the damage may be done before the armed forces have an opportunity to strike a single blow.

The need for effective police and internal security forces is particularly felt in those countries which are on or near the borders of the communist bloc. Here there is a vital need for protection against what has been called "internal invasion". As communist agents and troublemakers infiltrate into such countries and cause disorders, the governments must have security forces which can spot and arrest the leaders, and break up communist inspired riots and demonstrations. This does not call for tanks and jet aircraft; it calls for a trained and loyal police.

The various American programs for military and technical assistance to critical and underdeveloped areas can only bear fruit in a secure environment. It is for this reason that a number of countries where such aid is extended have requested that our programs should include help in building up the technical competence of local security forces to help to keep the peace internally and root out and suppress subversion. The trained police of this and other free countries where the art of maintaining order is well developed will no doubt be more and more called on to contribute their skills and manpower to help in this important phase of anti-communist activity.

While I am on the subject of Communist techniques, I might mention a somewhat recent development in their program of sowing international discord -- the Kremlin's new Trojan Horse -- but one that will look quite attractive to many countries which are under pressure to build up their military establishments.

As is well known, the Soviet emerged from World War II with a substantial stockpile of obsolescent and now fairly obsolete military equipment. This included, in addition to small arms, a good many thousands of medium and heavy tanks. Immediately following the War's end, the Soviet developed a whole new series of types of tanks and aircraft, including, in aircraft, for example, the MIG-15 fighter plane, the TU-4 (B-29 type) long-range piston bomber, and more recently the IL-28 light jet bomber.

It is now estimated that the Soviet has many thousands of these types of war equipment, some becoming obsolete, some surplus. All are likely to be replaced over the next few years. New tanks are in mass production, and new long and medium range bombers are coming off the assembly line. For example, the replacement of obsolescent MIG-15's with newer models has created a reserve of some four to six thousand MIG-15's of which a very substantial number could be off-loaded as an adjunct to a general program of causing trouble throughout the world.

Of course a good share of this equipment has already gone to Communist China and to Indochina with results which are now clearly seen. There remains ample for other parts of the world, and we now hear of advanced negotiations with several countries of the Middle East. I should not be at all surprised if we soon heard that countries in this hemisphere were being approached.

A premature start with this program was made over a year ago. You will remember that it was a ship load of obsolete arms sent by Czechoslovakia to Guatemala in the ill-famed freighter Alfhem, which aroused the Guatemalan people to a realization of the Communist plans for a takeover of that country. Once again Czechoslovakia looms up as the front for the delivery of communist arms; -- this time in the Middle East.

While this type of activity may not enter directly into your day by day work, it bears closely upon the over-all international security problem. We should keep a careful watch against the possibility that some of these surplus arms, particularly small arms, may find their way into the hands of selected unscrupulous private vendors and be used indiscriminately to foment trouble. Furthermore in certain areas of Southeast Asia there is an unholy alliance between the traffickers in arms and the opium smugglers. In such ways this surplus arms problem may eventually create police problems in the domestic areas of many countries.

Thus you in your task of law enforcement, and we who are working in the intelligence field, may find ourselves dealing with separate but related phases of a common security problem.

You, Chiefs of Police, have to deal with the domestic consequences and the outcroppings of many phases of an international movement which we, as Intelligence Officers, must make a high priority intelligence target.

World War I shook our confidence in our invulnerability to other people's wars. It took World War II and the aftermath of December 7, 1941, to persuade us that we could not safely disregard, or remain in ignorance of, hostile developments in any part of the world.

On that fateful day it was not just the garrison at Pearl Harbor but all of us who were asleep. We were then awakened to a new sort of world in which we henceforth have to live. There could be no thought of return to the pre-war complacency. In this situation it became increasingly important to know what was going on in the world outside of our boundaries. That required a sound intelligence system.

Congress established the Central Intelligence Agency under the National Security Act of 1947 which unified the Armed Services. There is I believe some misunderstanding of the nature and scope of the functions assigned to CIA, and I should like very briefly to clarify this point, particularly as it relates to your own work.

First of all Congress made a clear and wise distinction between the function of intelligence and that of the law enforcing agencies. It specifically provided that the Central Intelligence Agency should have no "police, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions." Hence when I need help in these fields I turn to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and on the local scene to many of you for help and assistance largely in the field of protecting the security of my own personnel and the base here in this country from which our intelligence work is conducted.

Of course intelligence has long been a function of our government even though, prior to World War II, on a scale far smaller than was customary in the case of most of the major powers of the world.

The Central Intelligence Agency was not devised by Congress primarily as a means of setting new intelligence activities into motion, although it did contemplate that the collection of intelligence should be stepped up. Rather, the new agency was conceived as an appropriate means of coordinating the intelligence activities of the government and to make then function more harmoniously and effectively toward the single end of national security. It did not supplant any existing intelligence agencies, but it was given certain duties in the intelligence field not then being carried out by others.

The United States Government receives today a vast amount of information from all parts of the world. Some of it comes as a by-product of our normal work in the field of foreign relations. Much of it comes from overt sources -- the press, radio, and foreign publications. Some of it comes through new scientific techniques. For science today plays an increasing role in the gathering of intelligence just as it does in law enforcement.

All of this information has to be studied, analyzed, and put into form for use by the policy makers. Intelligence of a counter-intelligence nature, or of direct interest to the law enforcement agencies of our government, is passed to these agencies and in particular to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

While, as I mentioned, there is a clear division of functions between the intelligence agencies and the law enforcing agencies in that the line between us is largely drawn at our frontiers, it is impossible to divide the over-all security problems at our borders. Over the past years there have been important instances where the traces of espionage against us were first picked up in distant capitals, although the operation was planned to be carried out in the continental United States. Agents trained for work here have in many cases been first spotted abroad. The follow-up here requires the closest coordination between our intelligence work abroad and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

In this and in other fields I can assure you that the cooperation with the FBI is smooth and effective. It was a great pleasure for me to be present the other day when our President conferred on Mr. J. Edgar Hoover the National Security Medal, the highest award the President could accord for work in this field of national security.

In further developing the coordination of our intelligence work there is held once a week under my chairmanship, a meeting of the heads of the various intelligence agencies. This includes in addition to CIA, a representative of Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence, of the State Department intelligence, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Atomic Energy Commission. Here we prepare together coordinated estimates embodying all available intelligence on critical foreign situations. We discuss current intelligence problems; we apportion as among the appropriate agencies various tasks for the collection of intelligence.

In this way and through appropriate standing committees which have been set up we have done everything possible to ensure that vital items of intelligence available to the government are promptly placed before the appropriate policy making officers of the government, the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and other members of the Cabinet or of the National Security Council, as appropriate.

In developing our intelligence mechanism we have constantly in mind the lessons of the past. We propose to do all we can in our field to see that we do not experience another Pearl Harbor. Then there was adequate intelligence to have put us on warning of the nature and location of the danger. There was then no adequate machinery for analyzing and disseminating that intelligence in an efficient and timely manner. Now we have corrected the mechanics. Only time can tell whether we will have the wisdom to draw the right conclusions from the intelligence we may have.

Here there are two major problems. Sometimes it is not too difficult to estimate, within certain margins of error, the strength of a potential enemy. If the intelligence community only does that, however, it has not really fulfilled its task. It has a duty also to estimate, on the basis of available intelligence, the probable or the possible intentions of any foe, or at least to indicate the alternative courses of action he may take. If one looks back to intelligence failures of the past, Pearl Harbor for example, we find that the error has generally come, not in a miscalculation of enemy strength but in a miscalculation of enemy intentions. Of course the policy maker often has to take a calculated risk where hostile intentions are not clear, and this applies both in the military and the political fields.

Today, of course, not only intelligence officers but millions of men and women throughout the world are trying to form their own intelligence estimate of the real intentions of the Soviet in the light of the recent Geneva Conference. Together with them the intelligence agencies are scanning the reports and analyzing the signs and trends as well as the statements and actions of the Soviet leaders themselves.

A few days ago at a banquet for the East German Communists, Nikita Khrushchev, the head of the Soviet Communist Party, made some interesting statements. It was one of his informal and likewise revealing speeches. He remarked, as reported by the radio and press services, that if anyone believes that our smiles involve abandonment of the teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin (the name of Stalin was added according to the official East German broadcasts but does not appear in the Moscow reports), he deceives himself poorly. Those who wait for that, he said, must wait until a shrimp learns to whistle.

There is some debate among the experts whether the word should be shrimp or crayfish for there is an old Russian proverb that says "I will do it when the crayfish whistles on the mountain top." This, I understand, is a Russian way of saying "Never";--although I learn on good authority that in the deep reaches of the sea, as detected by modern science, the crayfish or the shrimp do make some gurgling noises.

There is no hard evidence as yet, which we as intelligence or law enforcing officers can accept, that the dangers we face from the secret underground subversive activities of communism have ceased. Let us hope it does. Let us hope that Khrushchev hears the shrill call of the shrimp.

Meanwhile in all free countries we cannot relax our vigilance in meeting the dual problem of protecting our national security from the lawless elements within and the lawless elements directed and controlled from without. In these tasks we shall need sound intelligence as to the external and internal dangers to ensure effective enforcement of law within a framework which safeguards the rights of the individual.

20 September 1955.
Speech, as rewritten
by HS, for Mr. Dulles.
Retyped in
HS/DCI

of
 THE HONORABLE ALLEN WELSH DULLES
 DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

To
 THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE
 At
 PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA
 3 OCTOBER 1955

It is indeed an honor to appear before this Association which so well represents the coordinated interest in law enforcement on the part of the free world.

Although the problem of law enforcement and prevention and detection of crime is age old and has been an important problem throughout world history, the techniques of the criminal and the techniques of law enforcement and crime detection have changed with historical developments through the years. The basic motivations of the criminal, however, remain essentially the same and will continue to remain the same in the future history of our world. The exercise of police powers and controls has been one of steady development, improved techniques both in administration and application of scientific learning, and in the cooperation between the various jurisdictions of police authorities on both a national and international scale.

Since 1917, however, there has been introduced into the world a new element of lawlessness which has become a problem of increasing and serious concern to every law enforcement officer. This problem of lawlessness concerns the breaking of any number of our laws from the improper distribution of handbills on a street corner on through the law structure to espionage in its most serious form. Also included are incidents involving fomenting of unrest, inciting class hatred, riots, protest groups, and other disturbances which have

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a bearing on the peace and tranquillity of any community. The majority of these elements of lawlessness fall within the purview of the police authorities with the exception of those crimes involving espionage and interstate crimes as defined by federal law. There is a sharp difference between these categories of crimes and those committed by the ordinary criminal motivated by personal gain and other selfish desires. These crimes I speak of are a part of a cold war plan of a foreign power and are prepared, planned, and executed by persons completely devoted to the interests of those foreign powers and against the interests of the United States and the free world. Such crimes are committed with great skill, a good deal forethought and planning, and backed by an efficient organization. As a rule, the weaknesses displayed in the crimes committed by the ordinary criminal are absent from these types of crimes.

The law enforcement officer of today must not only be an authority on crime prevention for the protection of his immediate community, but he must also specialize in the detection and prevention of those crimes which are directed against the internal security of the United States. In this regard the police authorities of the United States and the free world are working in the front lines against the Communist threat to the internal security of the United States. The horizon of the interest of the police authority has been lifted in these past years from that of local enforcement to that of serving as a most important element in the national defense of our country.

The threat of Communist activity in all its forms, as directed from Moscow, from the satellite governments, and through the mediums

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of the local Communist Parties in each country, poses a most serious threat in that it is conducted by personnel as carefully selected, as highly trained, as highly motivated, and as skillfully accomplished as are the personnel of the police organizations operating to combat these evil influences. As a defense against these Communist tactics, we must rely on the skill of our police organizations and the laws of our country. In many cases these laws seem to be inadequate to cope with this threat, but the very essence of our national being, our form of government, our laws by men, requires that we meet this threat in full conformity with our laws and our concept of democracy, whereas the Communist conspiracy preaches deliberate violation of these laws whenever it suits their purposes. The police authority represents the very essence of democracy in action. He is the front-line defender against the criminal and subversive elements, and yet his enforcement of the law is and must be in strict conformity with the American ideals and traditions.

Let us look at the concept of the police authority of the Soviet or the satellite Communist governments. The police authorities of these countries are not troubled with presenting evidence, as we define it, to convince a jury that an individual is guilty of a crime against the state, particularly in the field of obstructing the Communization of the once free peoples now under Soviet or Chinese Communist domination. The Communist police officer can obtain his convictions for such crimes as obstructionism without any trouble at all. Plentiful evidence comes to police through post office boxes provided for denunciation of fellow countrymen by the peoples, the peoples courts in

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the Communist world have been instructed by their ministers of justice to avoid what is called pacific thinking which might lead to the mistake of giving lenient sentences to enemies of the state. The Communist courts have demonstrated time after time that they are unlikely to do any pacific thinking for the courts represent the instrument of the state to enforce the dictates of the state and the Communization of all its people and their actions are not based on the laws of free people promulgated for their mutual protection.

Take the case of what the Communists in East Germany call a police organization. There, the policeman is by no means confined to limited choices of enforcing written laws, street patrols, directing traffic, or driving a squad car. The East German policeman can go into artillery, tanks, or the air force if he wishes to specialize in these fields. Inasmuch as the East German police force numbers around 195,000 men, all trained in army, navy, and air force tactics, it appears that the East German government may be creating something more like military force than a police organization. In view of the unrest that has been evident in East Germany in recent years, one might very easily generate the suspicion and wonder if the purpose of this military-like police force, rather than being to protect the rights of the people, is designed to suppress any disposition that East Germans might show to revolt against the oppressive rule of the Communist masters.

You must realize that my appreciation of police problems is that of an outsider; however, the police problems of the United States are much the same as in the rest of the free world, a problem representing

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both suppression of crime and subversion. Both of these problems, by their very nature, are interstate and international in their complexion, and the only manner in which they can be vigorously combatted with all the powers at our control is through the fullest type of coordination and common effort. Whereas your work is wholly concerned with law enforcement in your respective countries, the Agency that I represent is expressly forbidden by law to take any part in the enforcement of law. In fact, one of the most significant provisos in the Act of Congress which created a Central Intelligence Agency, is that which excludes this Agency from any "police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions."

But even though the work of the Central Intelligence Agency legally cannot, and most certainly will not, invade your particular field, this Agency is frequently in need of your help and appreciative of all you do for it. In particular I should like to say that the assistance and support rendered by the chiefs of police in various city and state organizations has been of the greatest value to the Central Intelligence Agency. I hope we may continue to receive your cooperation.

Although an intelligence agency in a free country must be excluded from any part in the work of the police, there are obvious similarities between the two. Both must be concerned with the collection of evidence; both must undertake careful research in the analysis of the evidence; both must make deductions based on this analysis; and both must produce a well-reasoned and authenticated case based upon the whole process.

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I don't think I need to go into detail about any of these similarities. But there is another that I should like to bring to your attention which may be less evident: namely, the parallel between the growth in recent times of integrated police procedures on the one hand, and the development of centralized intelligence on the other, because they were irreducible conditions of life in this twentieth century.

The year 1908 makes a good starting point. In that year O. Henry published "The Gentle Crafters" which told about some lovable charlatans who went from place to place in the southwest swindling the public and getting away with it because they could avoid punishment by keeping on the move. Law enforcement was considered a local problem then and was locally handled. The "Gentle Crafters" were always safe in the next town. It was in that same year, however, (some fifteen years, by the way, after the founding of your own organization) that more than local aspects of crime were recognized by the Attorney General in the formation of the first Federal Bureau of Investigation. But the establishment of the FBI and its beginnings as an effective organization, were not necessarily synonymous. As everybody knows, it is no coincidence that the FBI became a real factor in the enforcement of federal law in 1924 when J. Edgar Hoover became its head. One augury of a successful future for the enterprise came when Mr. Hoover, as one of his first acts, established a centralized fingerprint collection to be maintained for the International Association of Chiefs of Police and all other contributing agencies and departments.

With the establishment of these two organizations - one a federal

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bureau and the other a voluntary association of police officials--enormous progress was made in the direction of bringing crime prevention into line with the realities of our times.

The Central Intelligence Agency also represents great but incomplete progress in a problem of achieving cooperation. The origins of this Agency date from the time when the United States not only could not afford a local view of internal affairs, but could no longer afford a national outlook in international affairs.

Nowadays, the United States must care about world alliances and world opinion, primarily because the world is smaller--just as the local police authority in America must interest himself in affairs beyond his own community because the United States is smaller.

It has been said that not just the garrison at Pearl Harbor, but all of us, were sound asleep on the morning of December 7, 1941. We were awakened, then and there, to the sort of world we were going to have to live in thereafter. We might have gone back to sleep again after the war, as had been our custom after previous wars, but the events of 1946 alone were enough to show us that there could be no sleep for the kind of world power that we had become. Aside from the fact of world leadership, and the more obvious elements in the world balance of power, there were two main reasons for this: the existence of explosive situations in many parts of the world, and the existence of an international conspiracy that was bent, among other things, upon making them more explosive.

We were confronted as a reality, as I have previously mentioned, with a vast political organization determined, regardless of any laws

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either civil or moral, to interfere with the rights of people in any non-Communist country to organize their political life as they saw fit. The arm of the International Communist movement with its headquarters in Moscow stretches into every corner of the world and is supported by an elaborate organization to carry out its activities.

As chiefs of police from all over the United States and from foreign countries, you know this international conspiracy well and at first hand, for it operates wherever it chooses, with disregard for local law except where it hopes to pervert the safeguards of the free world to its purposes. I am sure the FBI could not discharge its responsibilities to protect the United States against such internal subversion except through the invaluable cooperation of state and local police authorities any more than you could do your job as well as you do now without the cooperation of the FBI. We too, by the way, work in cooperation with the FBI, Treasury Department, and other Federal departments and agencies on many matters of common interest and know how valuable that cooperation can be.

Largely because of what your organization represents, I feel certain that the international Communists are going to find it harder and harder to make any progress, by means of internal subversion, in undermining the freedoms that they wish to destroy.

The Central Intelligence Agency was, of course, not expressly formed by Congress to combat international Communism outside the area where national police forces deal with it, but this naturally became one of its tasks. In 1947, however, Congress was aware of this Soviet-led conspiracy that increased the danger of war by forceful annexation

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of new territory, and by attempts to weaken and divide the free countries. In a perilous world, grown so small that disaster could happen far more suddenly and unexpectedly than at Pearl Harbor, there was little alternative to the establishment of central intelligence in some form. Without a sound intelligence system, there could be no real protection against the dangers that beset us.

But just as the beginnings of national and international police cooperation did not coincide with the establishment of police forces themselves, so the creation of Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 did not coincide with the beginnings of intelligence activities on the part of the United States. Intelligence -- which, simply defined, is knowing what is happening in other parts of the world -- has always been a function of our government, even though on a smaller scale than was customary in many other governments.

The Central Intelligence Agency was not devised by Congress as a means of setting intelligence activities in motion; but rather as a way of bringing together all the activities of the government related to intelligence and making them function harmoniously toward the single end of national security. If you read the National Security Act of 1947, you will find that the main duty of Central Intelligence is to "coordinate"; that is to say, its job is to supply the means through which diverse activities may be unified for recognized purposes.

In these complicated times this is no mean job. The United States Government receives a good deal of information from abroad. Some of it comes as a by-product of our normal transactions in foreign

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countries; some comes by way of the information that foreign countries normally publish for the rest of the world to see; some is deliberately sought for intelligence purposes. All of this information has to be studied, sorted, analyzed, and filed away for reference. What can be gleaned from it of importance has to be assembled and sent, in the form of various reports, to those in authority who need the information. This job of coordination belongs to Central Intelligence.

There is nothing very glamorous about the process. In essence, it more resembles the work of a scholar, piecing together information stored in libraries than it does the romantic intrigues of the beautiful international spy so dear to the hearts of those who purvey fiction to an eager public. I suspect that you follow me more exactly in this matter than most people could, since you must see the parallel between our work and the painstaking research that you do in preparation for an apparently sudden and dramatic arrest and conviction.

Painstaking research has largely taken the place of dramatic adventure in intelligence. Once upon a time, when a small group of men controlled foreign policy in the name of the king, possession of their immediate plans meant knowledge of their country's intentions. In those days, the shifty agent who could penetrate the confidence of this group was ^{an} indispensable, if not wholly desirable, element in intelligence work. But in modern times, although a small group of men (as in the USSR) may control a nation's foreign policy in theory, it cannot do so in fact.

For that reason, it is necessary, in order to understand a

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country's intentions, to know much more than what its rulers would like to do. You must find out what those rulers can and will do in terms of their own strengths and weaknesses and their relations with the rest of the world. Particularly with respect to a major foreign power, this requires a great deal more than any one agent, no matter how astute or resourceful, can possibly find out.

In fact, espionage, either exciting or humdrum, is not the primary answer to the problem. The answer is partly to be found in manifold kinds of information gathered from numerous sources (mostly quite public) about conditions all over the world; and partly in what a great many people of many backgrounds and specializations can make of this information after they have put it all together. No single intelligence agency of any government could provide the answer. The coordinated efforts of many parts of the government and of the nation generally must be combined if even a partial answer is to be found.

The job of Central Intelligence is to provide this service of coordination to the government and particularly for the benefit of the National Security Council, to which I directly report. As you know, the National Security Council, whose chief members are the President of the United States, the Secretaries of State and Defense, represents the President's special advisory body on questions of foreign policy. Although I sit with the Council as Director of Central Intelligence, I neither vote with it nor do I give it advice regarding foreign policy. The reason is that neither the formation of foreign policy nor advice on what policies to follow is the business of intelligence. My function--aside from advising the Council on matters of

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intelligence organization--is to provide foreign information pertinent to the policy deliberations of the National Security Council and for the benefit of those who give the Council advice.

This foreign information has been gathered and compiled by the Agency of which I am Director, in cooperation with other agencies of the government, particularly those concerned with intelligence in the Departments of State and of Defense. Before it is considered ready for the Council, however, it is fully discussed with the heads of military and civilian intelligence (including, of course, Mr. Hoover or his representative) to make sure that all of us are in agreement on the accuracy of our facts and the authenticity of the interpretation placed upon them.

One of the ultimate aims of police work, I take it, is to make all the facts available to a court in order that it may render a sound verdict. Our aim is similar, except that our "court" is the National Security Council. I suspect that in the long run, both of us proceed in much the same way in assembling and presenting these facts.

Upon your success depends the protection of society against the criminal and subversive elements in it. Upon ours depends, in part, the protection of our national security against the lawless element in international affairs. Apart from the physical protection represented in the military establishment, a sound and working intelligence system is the best protection that any government may have against that element.

In the eight years since Congress brought the Central Intelligence

Agency into being, we have made considerable progress toward carrying out its mandate. We have not, of course, solved all the problems. Although intelligence was already old in the government in 1947, the idea of central intelligence was new. Old habits had to be changed; new methods of procedure had to be devised and made to work. I am aware that the problem of coordination within a single government faced by Central Intelligence was perhaps simpler than that which has long faced your organization in relating the work of many governments; but it was complicated enough and did not yield to immediate solution.

At the present time, however, I am convinced that intelligence is so organized for the United States that we can confidently face the terrifying complications of the twentieth century in the knowledge that our policies are guided by sound information, and that our defenses are well prepared against any attempt at a surprise attack. We will continue to improve our services toward these goals.

May we all work together for the good of our country.

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